Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) in China: Barriers and drivers from ESCOs' perspective by Ma, Ding
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) in China: Barriers
and drivers from ESCOs' perspective
International Business
Master's thesis
Ding Ma
2013
Department of Information and Service Economy
Aalto University
School of Business
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) in
China
Barriers and drivers from ESCOs’ perspective
Master’s Thesis
Ding Ma
01.05.2013
Information and Service
Management
Approved in the Department of Information and Service Economics   _____________
 and awarded the grade _______________
_____ ________________________________________ __________
1st inspector’s first name family name 2nd inspector’s first name family name
2AALTO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS ABSTRACT
Department of Information and Service Economy 01.05.2013
Master’s thesis
Ding Ma
ABSTRACT
Objectives of the Study
China as the world’s largest energy consumer and greenhouse gases emitter has a great urgency
to improve its energy efficiency. Chinese Central government has made ambitious targets to
reduce energy and carbon intensity in the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015). It also leverages the
important role of Energy Service Companies (ESCO) using Energy Performance Contracting
(EPC) in achieving these targets. Despite the huge potential and favoring policies, ESCO’s
diffusion in China is far from reaching its potential and large amount of cost-effective investment
opportunities are unexploited. Therefore, the objective of this research is to offer an
understanding of the underlying economics of ESCO market in China, and to contribute to the
knowledge about the drivers and barriers in China for ESCOs.
Academic background and methodology
The theoretical  framework guiding this study was the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). It  is
said, that the slow diffusion rates of ESCO market can be understood in terms of transaction
costs. While Oliver Williamson developed the original theory, this study used the determinants
of  production  and  transaction  costs  modeled  by  Sorrell  to  identify  the  important  barriers  and
drivers to ESCOs in China. Extensive literature review was done to understand the development
of Chinese ESCO industry and semi-structured interviews were conducted for the empirical
research.
Findings and conclusions
In the current market’s elements, most ESCOs are SMEs; projects concentrating in industry
sector using mainly Shared Saving Model and the industry’s investments and energy savings far
from potentials. Variables as ESCO’s and customer’s size, relation between ESCO and customer
were suggested to complete Sorrell’s explanatory model for energy service contracting. More
valuably, Chinese ESCOs perceptions were classified into the market, institutional, financial and
technological barriers and drivers. Most important perceived barriers were intense competition
for customers and technical experts, uncertainty in market dynamics with abrupt M&As,
complexity in project and reward approval, difficulties in financing and lack of domestic
technology. Most important perceived drivers were demonstrative effect of successful projects,
standardized contract model, financing resource through capital market and cooperation with
experts from education and research institutions.
Keywords
Energy efficiency, Energy Service Company, ESCO in China, Transaction Cost Economics
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ABSTRAKTI
Tutkimuksen tavoitteet
Kiina, maailman suurimpana energian kuluttajana ja hiilipäästöjen tuottajana, on isojen
ympäristöhaasteiden edessä. Kiinan valtio onkin asettanut kunnianhimoiset tavoitteet
energiaintensiteetin ja hiilidioksidi-intensiteetin alentamiselle 12. viisivuotissuunnitelmassa.
ESCO-konsepti on nostettu valtiontasolla keskeiseksi keinoksi energiakäytön tehostamiseen.
Suuresta markkinatarpeesta ja myönteisestä politiikasta huolimatta, ESCOn leviäminen Kiinassa
kaukana sen potentiaalistaan. Tämän Pro Gradu-tutkielman tarkoitus on antaa ymmärrystä
ESCO-toimialan kehitystä sen alkuvaiheista nykyhetkeen ja selvittää ESCOa edistävät ja estävät
tekijät.
Kirjallisuuskatsaus ja metodologia
Transaktiokustannusteoria toimii keskeisenä teoreettisena viitekehyksenä tässä Pro Gradu-
tutkielmassa. David Sorrell (2005) on kehittänyt kyseisen teorian pohjalta oman viitekehyksen
energiapalveluiden sopimiseen. Hänen mallinmukaisia tuotannon- ja transaktionkulutekijöitä
käytettiin kiinalaisten ESCO-yritysten edistävien ja estävien tekijöiden tunnistamiseen. Kiinan
ESCO-toimialan nykytilan ymmärtämistä varten tehtiin laaja-alainen kirjallisuuskatsaus  ja semi-
strukturoiduilla haastatteluilla kartoitettiin toimialaa edistäviä ja estäviä tekijöitä.
Tulokset ja päätelmät
Kiinan nykyisissä markkinaelementeissä suurin osa ESCOista on PK-yrityksiä, projektit
keskittyvät teollisuuteen ja niissä käytetään pääasiallisesti Shared Savings-mallia. Toimialan
investoinnit ja energiansäästöt ovat kuitenkin kaukana potentiaalistaan. ESCOn ja asiakkaan
koko sekä ESCO:n ja asiakkaan väliset suhteet ovat ehdotettuja muuttujia täydentämään
Sorrellin mallia energiapalveluiden sopimiseen. Tutkielman arvokkaimmat tulokset ovat
kiinalaisten ESCO-yritysten näkemykset estävistä ja edistävistä tekijöistä. Kova kilpailu
asiakkaista ja teknisistä osaajista, äkillisistä yrityskaupoista johtuva epävarmuus
markkinadynamiikassa, projektien ja tukien hyväksymisprosessien monimutkaisuus,
rahoitukselliset vaikeudet ja kotimaisen teknologian puute ovat tärkeimpiä havaittuja esteitä.
Onnistuneiden projektien mainosvoima, standardoitu sopimusmalli, rahoituksen järjestäminen
pääomamarkkinoilta ja yhteistyö koulutus- ja tutkimusinstituutioiden asiantuntijoiden kanssa
ovat taas tärkeimpiä havaittuja kannustimia.
Avainsanat
Energiatehokkuus, Energiapalveluyritys, ESCO Kiinassa, Transaktiokustannusteoria
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5ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
EE Energy Efficiency
EMC Energy Management Contracting
EMCA ESCO Committee of China Energy Conservation Association
EMCo Energy Management Company
EPC Energy Performance Contracting
ESCO Energy Service Company
FI Financial institution
GEF Global Environment Facility
GHGs Greenhouse gases
IFC International Finance Center
MOF Ministry of Finance
NAESCO National Association of Energy Service Company of the United States
NDRC National Development and Reform Committee
SME Small and Medium Enterprise
SOE State-owned Enterprise
Tce Ton of coal equivalent
TCE Transaction Cost Economics
WB World Bank
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The ever-increasing energy consumption has resulted in dramatic changes of the environment
constituting a threat to our society. Caused by the greenhouse effect, global warming has gained
great attention worldwide. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are from the high consumption of
non-renewable fossil energy sources as coal, oil, and natural gas. Countries around the world
have attached great important to energy conservation and energy efficiency. From the
perspective of business world, energy cost accounts for a sizeable proportion of the total
operation cost, especially in energy intensive industries. Exploring the ways to improve energy
efficiency and reduce energy costs has risen to be one of the main subjects for the business world.
Comparing to the developed countries, China’s energy issues are more serious. China’s energy
intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) is 2.65 times of the world’s average, 3.9 times
higher  than  the  United  States,  4.32  times  higher  than  the  European  Union  and  over  8  times  of
Japan. China consumes 36% of world’s total steel consumption, 16% of energy consumption and
52% of cement consumption, but only creating 7% of global total GDP (EIA, 2012). Therefore,
the country has an urgent need to improve its energy efficiencies.
China is the largest consumer and a net importer of energy. As the dependence on energy
imports increases, the concern of energy security draws the strategic importance of energy
efficiency (EE) in China. At the same time, as the world’s largest Greenhouse Gases emitter (80%
from burning coals (Dresseen, 2011)), China also suffers from serious environmental-pollution
problems related to energy. According to China’s environmental analysis report released in 2013,
seven of the world’s ten most polluted cities are located in China. By the term of conducting this
study, Beijing’s air quality was recorded as 30 times over international safety levels (January
2013). The environmental pressures again address the importance of energy efficiency. As the
result, Chinese government has put high emphasis on this issue.
Chinese government had a goal to reduce energy intensity for 20 percent in its 11th five-year plan
(2006-2010). In its recent 12th five-year plan, China has targeted to further reduce energy
intensity by 17.3 per cent by 2015 and 31 per cent by 2020 from 2010 levels, and even more
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ambitiously a 40-45 per cent carbon intensity reduction in future ten years from 2010 levels.
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) have become a national policy priority for government and
play an important role in achieving these targets (Dresseen 2011).
Energy Service Company (ESCO) concept using Energy performance contracting (EPC)
mechanism was developed in North America in the 1970s after the oil crises. Chinese
government together with World Bank (WB) and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
introduced this market-oriented mechanism for energy efficiency in China in 1998. It is expected
that ESCOs will play an important role in promoting energy efficiency in countries outside of the
US (Vine et al. 2003).
1.2 Research objective
The energy efficiency and ESCO market potential in China is huge due to the numerous large-
scale, inefficient energy-intensive industrial companies. A general estimation of the investment
opportunity by International Finance Corporation (2011) excessed 100 billion US dollars. The
saving potentials estimated by the current energy consumption level were up to 40% (Zhang et
al., 2008). Due to the strategic importance of EE, national policies are also favouring ESCOs
(IFC 2011).
Despite the huge potential and favouring policies, there are strong opinions from researchers that
ESCO’s diffusion in China is far from reaching its potential and large amount of cost-effective
investment opportunities are unexploited (Gan 2009, Li & Colombier 2009, Limaye & Limaye
2011, Li 2012, Kostka & 2013). The phenomenon that economically profitable energy efficiency
investments are not being realized is called “energy-efficiency paradox” (Zhang 2003). It is also
known as “energy efficiency gap” expressing the difference between the potential cost-effective
energy efficiency investments and the actual investment level implemented (Brown, 2001;
Levine et al., 1995; Golove and Eto, 1996; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sanstad and Howarth, 1994.
Cited in Goldman et al., 2005). Why is this the case? The existence of “energy efficiency
paradox” or “energy efficiency gap” is discussed in terms of market failures and market barriers
(Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Goldman et al., 2005; Rohdin et al., 2007). Goldman et al. continued
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stating  that  the  slow  diffusion  rates  of  ESCO  market  can  be  better  understood  in  terms  of  the
transaction costs rather than the types of neo-classical market failures.
Under this big picture, the objective of this research is to offer a general understanding of the
underlying economics of ESCO market in China, and to contribute to the knowledge about the
drivers and barriers in China’s ESCO industry by identifying and analysing the existing and
perceived drivers and barriers from ESCOs’ perspective.
To address the purpose of the research, this study aim to answer the following research questions
from supporting questions to the main question:
Supplementary research questions:
1. What is the state of ESCO in China?
2. What are the identified drivers and barriers for both ESCOs and its potential customers in
China?
Primary research question:
3.  Under  Sorrell’s  transaction  cost  economics  (TCE)  framework,  justify  the  effects  of  the
production and transaction cost determinants in resulting of viable ESCO project. How Chinese
ESCOs have perceived the previously identified drivers and barriers under the TCE framework?
14
1.3 Methodologies
The core theoretical framework guiding this study is the transaction costs economics (TCE) (See
Chapter 4). According to Sorrell (2007), the total savings in production costs must be greater
than the transaction costs in order to have an economically viable energy service contracting. For
the first research question, extensive literature will be reviewed for the description of ESCO
development from its introduction to present. To answer the research question two, drivers for
and barriers to the supply and demand sides will be identified from industrial and governmental
sources. The empirical research will be conducted by interviewing Chinese ESCOs. Details of
empirical research design and process are described in Chapter 5. With semi-structured
interviews, we hope to gain valuable answers to the third research question as finding the
important drivers and barriers under the determinants of transaction costs. Additionally,
supplementary interviews with national ESCO association and local energy conservation centre
will be conducted to support this study.
1.4 Disposition of the thesis
This paper is divided into seven chapters. Introduction chapter presents the background for this
study, the objective and research questions, the research methodologies used to answer the
research questions and outline of the paper. Second chapter provides solid understanding base of
ESCO-concept, what it is, how it works and to whom it targets. The third chapter concentrates on
describing the development and current state of China’s ESCO market and the identified drivers
for and barriers to ESCO development through extensive literature reviews. Transaction Cost
Economics as the theoretical framework for the empirical research is introduced in chapter four
with the focus on Sorrell’s model. In chapter five, the design and process of the empirical
research is presented and followed by result presentation in chapter six. The last chapter
concludes this study and discusses the limitations and future research objectives.
15
2 THE CONCEPT OF ESCO
In  this  chapter,  we  will  present  the  definitions  of  what  ESCO  is,  how  it  works  and  who  the
customers are. This chapter will offer the audiences a general understanding of the conceptual
backgrounds.
2.1 Definition of ESCO and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC)
Energy  Service  Company  (ESCO)  is  a  relatively  fresh  concept,  firstly  developed  in  North
America in the 1970s and the introduced to China in 1998. For many of us, ESCO remains still
unaware; therefore this subchapter aims at clarifying the concept of ESCO.
So  what  is  ESCO?  National  Association  of  Energy  Service  Company  of  the  United  States
(NAESCO) defines ESCO as “a business that develops, installs, and arranges financing for
projects designed to improve the energy efficiency and maintenance costs for facilities over a
seven to twenty year time period”. In the “General Technical Rules for Energy Performance
Contracting (GB/T 24915-2010)” issued by China’s National Standardization Management
Committee in 2010, it has a more loose definition including any professional company, that
offers energy audit, energy-saving project design, financing, renovation (construction, equipment
installation, setting), operation and management services as an energy service company. China
also uses the term “Energy Management Company (EMC or EMCo)” equally to ESCO. To avoid
any confuses for the audience, this study will concentrate on using the abbreviation “ESCO”
referring both.
Under these definitions, what are the differences between ESCO and other companies in the
energy-saving consulting or in the energy-saving equipment manufacturing business? Bertoldi et
al. (2005) stated that ESCO differs from others as it guarantees the energy savings, it finances or
assists in financing. ESCO’s remuneration is based on the energy-savings achieved.
Fundamentally, ESCO is undertaking the technical and performance risks from customer by
using the Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) concept. Again, China uses here the term
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“Energy Management Contracting (EMC)” equally to EPC. This study will use the abbreviation
“EPC” referring both.
What is Energy Performance Contracting? In the EU’s Energy Service Directive (2006/32/EC),
the energy performance contract is defined as: “a contractual arrangement between the customer
and ESCO of an energy efficiency improvement measure, where investments in that measure are
paid for in relation to a contractually agreed level of energy efficiency improvement.” In China’s
general technical rules, EPC is an energy efficiency service mechanism, where the energy
service company and the energy end-user make a contractual agreement on the energy-saving
targets of the energy efficiency project. The energy service company provides the services to
achieve the energy-saving targets and the energy end-user pays the energy service company’s
investment with a reasonable profit according to the energy savings.
The basic EPC concept illustrated by the World Bank (See Figure 1) further clarifies that ESCO
offers a comprehensive range of energy efficiency related services through a guaranteed EPC
contract to the customers.
Figure 1 EPC basic concept (World Bank, 2007)
The EPC gives customers the opportunity to upgrade their processes and equipment initially
without own investments. From these definitions, we can see that the remuneration of ESCO in
EPC is directly based on the energy-saving amount. If the energy efficiency improvements are
not  achieved,  the  ESCO  doesn’t  get  paid.  For  comparison,  the  non-EPC  arrangement  is
traditionally based on a fixed fee-for-service contract with no direct linkage to the result of
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energy services. In most ESCO projects, after the end of contract, the energy-saving value is
passed on to the customer. Figure 2 further illustrates the ESCO’s profit model.
Figure 2 ESCO's remuneration model
2.2 Characteristics of ESCO
The ESCO-concept has some specific characteristics. Hereby the most significant ones are listed.
Commerciality: Energy service is a commercial operation. The energy performance contracting
mechanism is implemented in energy service projects to achieve the purpose of profit for ESCO.
Adaptability: ESCO has a modular approach incorporating different kinds of services to meet
customer’s needs. It can adapt the scope of services including necessary components into the
energy service package. (Bleyl-Androschin, 2009) ESCO is not about promoting any particular
energy efficiency equipment or technology. By energy performance contracting, ESCO provides
an integrated comprehensive “turnkey” energy-saving solution. ESCO is not a financial
institution, but it can assist the customer to get the project funding. ESCO is not necessarily
energy-saving technology owner or equipment manufacturer, but it has the ability to choose the
suitable technology and equipment for the customer. ESCO may not necessarily have in-house
18
engineering capability to implement the project, but it can give guarantee promise of project
implementation.
Riskiness: The ESCO bears the most of technical and performance risks and sometimes even the
financial risks under the EPC. The invested equipment are usually specifically designed for
project’s processes and systems, therefore they have a limited resale value. The long duration of
the projects makes it vulnerable for external and internal changes. ESCO business is a high-risk
business and the key to success lies on the ability of risk management.
2.3 ESCO project elements
As stated in the previous paragraph, one of ESCO’s characteristics is the modular approach.
ESCO generally provides its customer a comprehensive package of energy services. The service
scope includes all or some of the following elements (See Figure 3):
Figure 3 ESCO project elements
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(1) Energy audit. ESCO determines customer’s energy usage profile and energy demand
structure to propose the energy-saving potential. It also performs evaluation of energy
conservation measures.
(2) Energy-saving design/engineering. According to the results of energy audit, ESCO proposes
the energy service solution to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy costs. ESCO usually
provides both engineering calculation and financial pro-forma to illustrate the project’s benefits.
ESCO can continue with more detailed implementation design/engineering after customer
accepts the energy-saving proposal.
(3) Project financing. Depend on the EPC model used, ESCO may provide from its own capital,
assist the customer or acquire itself through third-party financing channels the needed
investments for the project.
(4) Raw materials and equipment procurement. ESCO purchases the necessary materials and
equipment according to the requirements either from its own production or externally.
(5) Construction and installation. Under the EPC contract, ESCO is responsible for project
construction  and  equipment  installation.  It  is  usually  done  either  by  ESCO  or  delegated  to
qualified construction units.
(6) Operation, training and maintenance. ESCO usually possesses an operational role over the
life of the contract. Most projects include the maintenance of all or some of the newly installed
equipment over the life of the contract. As an additional service, most ESCOs also provide
training for customers’ stuff to operate and maintain the equipment. (NAESCO)
(7) Monitoring and validation. Together with customer, ESCO monitors the differences between
pre-implementation and post-implementation, and verifies the actual savings through the agreed
measurement.
As mentioned earlier, one of the differences between ESCOs and other engineering companies,
energy-saving equipment suppliers or technology providers is the energy performance
contracting used in ESCO business. Figure 4 further emphasizes that ESCOs have the capability
to offer comprehensive energy services, while others have only competences in certain elements.
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Figure 4 Comparison between ESCOs and other energy service companies (Siitonen, 2012)
2.4 Performance contracting models
Generally agreed by the academic and business world (CTI, 2003; Dreessen 2003; J.P. Painuly et
al. 2003; Hansen, 2003; Poole and Stoner, 2003; Bertoldi & Rezessy, 2005; Bertoldi et al., 2006;
Taylor et al., 2008), there are two major energy performance contracting models: Guaranteed
Savings model and Shared Savings model. Beside these two, there are also other mixed models
or sub-variations. This subchapter will mainly focus on introducing the two dominant models.
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Figure 5 Guaranteed savings model (Dresseen, 2003)
In the guaranteed savings model, customer carries the credit risk by funding the project through
its own capital or by signing a loan contract with financial institution. Under this model, the
customer is fully responsible for the loan payments. The loan also goes on customer’s balance
sheet affecting customer’s debt ratio. ESCO does not enter into any financial relationships with
the financial institution, but may assist the customer in seeking them through its networks. ESCO
carries only performance risk by having an EPC with customer. In the contract, the energy
saving amount is guaranteed by ESCO.
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Figure 6 Shared savings model (Dresseen, 2003)
In the shared savings model, ESCO carries both credit and performance risk. ESCO provides an
energy performance contact for customer and acts as “financing institution” by securing
necessary investment itself or through a loan agreement with third-party financial institution. In
this model, customer can benefit from off-balance sheet financing because the debt service is
treated  as  an  operational  expense  (Bertoldi  &  Resessy,  2005).  The  payment  for  ESCO  is  the
reduction in operational expenses, not the debt of investment (CTI, 2003). The performance is
linked to the cost of energy saved during and after the project. The customer shares a split of
realized energy savings with ESCO for a specified period. Accordingly, there is no standard split
percentage, as it is dependence on the various nature of the project (Bertoldi et al. 2006). From
the ESCO`s perspective, shared savings model increases the involvement between ESCO and its
customer by adding the financial service, which tights up the business relationship. The off-
balance financing possibility also increases the attractiveness of contracting. On the downside, it
limits  long-term  growth  of  small  ESCOs,  since  a  small  volume  of  projects  saturates  ESCO’s
balance sheet (Taylor et al. 2008).
It  is  argued  (Lin  et  al.,  2004;  Bertoldi  et  al.,  2006)  that  the  lack  of  reliable  and  commercially
viable long-term financing for energy efficiency projects makes the shared savings model the
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only possible model for introduction in the developing markets. The guaranteed savings model is
not suitable for introduction, since it requires customers to assume credit risks. The guaranteed
savings model also required a well-established banking structure, where banking sector are
highly  aware  of  energy  efficiency  projects  (Bertoldi  et  al.  2006).  An  important  difference
between guaranteed and shared savings models is that the performance guarantee is the level of
energy saved in guaranteed savings model, while it is the cost of energy saved in shared savings
model (Hansen 2003, Poole and Stoner 2003).
Table 1 Differences between two models from customers' perspective
A third model called outsourcing energy management model is also used case by case in China,
where ESCO manages customer’s energy-use systems for a fee (ASTAE 2008). The profit comes
from the difference in the energy cost before and after ESCO undertakes energy efficiency
renovations with a fee.
Customers’ view Shared saving-model Guaranteed saving-model
Credit risk No Yes
Payment Shares % on energy cost
savings for a pre-determined
period to ESCO
Debt repayment to FI
Fee for guaranteed energy-
saving level to ESCO
Accounting Off balance sheet Debt on balance sheet
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2.5 Scope of ESCO customers
Commercial and profit-seeking ESCOs identify and design energy efficiency projects for a
variety of customers. The customer range of ESCO generally includes all type of energy end-
users with large energy consumption. The categorization can be made according to the next table.
Table 2 ESCO's customer categorization
Building sector Industry sector Traffic sector
Private e.g. mall e.g. paper mill e.g. automobile
power
Public e.g. school e.g. district heating
company
e.g. public lighting
In the building sector, the ESCO projects are mostly related to the modernization of lighting
systems, elevating systems, controlling systems, renovation of air conditioning, heating and
ventilation systems et cetera. In the industry, the projects mostly include e.g. equipment retrofits,
upgrades, air-pressure and heat recovery system renovation and so on. The customers can be
government or municipal institutions, state-owned enterprises, also private-owned buildings and
businesses. In the traffic sector, the customers are mainly municipalities that wish to modernize
their public-lighting systems (Zhang, 2003).
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW OF ESCO DEVELOPMENT IN
CHINA
This chapter describes the development of ESCO industry in China from its introduction to
present (2013). This chapter also identifies the drivers for and barriers to ESCO development in
this specific market through reviewing literature from industrial and governmental sources.
Answers to research questions one and two are provided in this chapter.
3.1 Historical performance
ESCO as a market-oriented mechanism for promoting energy efficiency was developed in North
America in the late 1970s after the oil crises. The introduction to China was through an
international cooperation between China’s State Economic and Trade Commission nowadays
known as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the World Bank (WB)
and Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1998. The “China Energy Conservation Project” was
divided into two phases. Phase I with GEF grants of 22 million US dollars and International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan of 63 million US dollars (Sun et al, 2011). The
main objective of phase I was to promote EPC mechanism and develop ESCO industry in China.
The objective was achieved through demonstration and dissemination. Under the project frame
three energy service companies (ESCOs) were established, each from Liaoning Province,
Shandong Province and Beijing Municipality. These ESCOs were dedicated to demonstrate the
applicability of ESCO business model in China. At the same time, non-profitable Energy
Conservation Information Dissemination Center was established to introduce and develop energy
performance contracting. (Zhang 2003, WB 1998)
Three piloting ESCOs operated as commercial business, adapting the energy performance
contracting to suit the Chinese business environment. In the demonstration phase, these ESCOs
used Shared Savings Model. ESCOs financed the projects, undertook the technical risks and
owned the equipment installed for customers. The payback was a share of the energy savings
achieved, covering the investment, operating costs, risks and a reasonable profit. (WB, 1998)
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During the phase I, these three ESCOs have proven to be successful and have grown
significantly their ESCO business. On average, Beijing, Liaoning and Shandong ESCOs’ assets
have grown over 9 times. (WB, 2007) The figure below illustrates the development of these three
ESCOs in both net worth and revenue.
Figure 7 Financial performance of demonstration ESCOS (WB, 2007)
World Bank (2007) reported, that during the energy conservation project from 1998 to 2006, the
total  energy  savings  were  5.92  million  tons  of  coal  equivalent  and  carbon  dioxide  emissions
reductions were 5.06 million tons of carbon.
The success of these piloting ESCOs has proved the feasibility of EPC in China and has created
positive reactions among new players to enter the ESCO business. Under these market conditions,
the Second Energy Conservation Project was approved in 2002 to help new ESCOs to obtain
local bank loans through a special loan guarantee program and China’s own ESCO industrial
association was established (WB, 2007). ESCO Committee of China Energy Conservation
Association  (EMCA)  was  registered  in  2003.  The  mission  of  EMCA  was  to  promote  the
sustainable development of ESCO industry and to support the fast and healthy growth of ESCO
(EMCA).
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The energy conservation project has demonstrated the strong market demand for energy
performance contracting services across sectors. Next subchapter will look into the current status
of ESCO in China.
3.2 Current market situation
The market information was collected through secondary sources from EMCA’s surveys in the
end of 11th five-year plan (2010) and 2011. The statistics for 2012 was not yet released during
this study. Therefore, it was obtained through primary data collection from EMCA officer. The
“ESCO best practices 2012” published by EMCA in January 2013 was also reviewed as
reference literature. Despite some skepticism toward Chinese statistical data among international
audiences, the following subchapter will present five insights of the trends in China’s ESCO
industry through the dataset available.
3.2.1 Most ESCOs are SMEs
By  the  end  of  11th five-year plan, the total number of ESCOs using energy performance
contracting was 782, which is 8-fold of the amount in 10th five-year plan 2001-2005 (see Table
3). The strong growth continued, almost doubled in 2011 and tripled in 2012. By the end of 2012,
the total number of companies in ESCO industry by EMCA sources were 4175, among these
2339  were  registered  with  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF)  and  National  Development  and
Reform Committee (NDRC).
“While there are about 20 very large ESCOs today, most Chinese ESCOs are small” (IFC, 2011).
From  the  size  and  investment  capacity  of  Chinese  ESCOs,  there  are  totally  6  ESCOs  with
turnover exceeding 1 billion RMB, 18 over 0.5 billion and 83 greater than 100 million RMB in
2012. Among these ESCOs, 12 had invested over 500 million RMB and 46 over 100 million
RMB.  As  the  requirement  for  receiving  national  ESCO  status  from  MOF  and  NDRC  was  5
million RMB registered capital, most of the ESCOs are categorized as SMEs in China. Most of
Chinese ESCOs are technology-oriented, such as technology and equipment vendors. Increasing
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numbers of market-oriented ESCOs with existing customer base and strong financial capability
but without self-developed technologies are also entering the market.
3.2.2 ESCO investments and energy savings far from potentials
Figure 8 ESCO projects’ investments 2005-2012 (EMCA)
Figure 8 shows that the investments in ESCO projects have grown from 1.3 to 28.8 billion RMB
during the 11th five-year plan with a growth rate over 22 times. The growth rate has been steadier
last year, but still at a twenty-two per cent annual rate. By the end of 2012, the total investments
in ESCO projects were 50.6 billion RMB. A general estimation of the investment opportunity by
International Finance Corporation (2011) excessed 100 billion US dollars (about 630 billion
RMB), which means that large amount of investment opportunities still remains unexploited.
From the “best practices”, the project investment of single project varies from tens of thousands
to over one hundred million RMB, with an average of two million.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
billion RMB 1.3 1.9 6.6 11.7 19.5 28.8 41.2 55.7
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Figure 9 ESCO projects’ energy savings 2005-2012 (EMCA)
Although growth rate in China’s ESCO industry has been strong, the scale of the industry is still
relatively small comparing to the potentials and needs of the energy conservation market in
China (ASTAE 2008). World Bank (2007) estimated that technologically feasible and
economically reasonable energy conservation potential in China’s market exceeded 300 million
tons of coal equivalence. Despite the annual growth in energy savings, the contribution of ESCO
industry in fulfilling the total energy conservation potential counted only for about five percent
in year 2012.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mtce 0.9 1.2 3.2 5.7 9.6 10.7 16.5 18.2
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3.2.3 ESCO projects concentrating in industry sector
Figure 10 Customers of China's ESCOs 2010 (Li, 2011)
Li Jianwei from the development research center of the state council presented figure 10 in the
“Energy efficiency solutions summit 2011”. Investments in the industry sector covered a large
share of the total ESCO projects in 2010. As the industry sector is the largest energy consumer in
China, it is natural that most of the current energy savings are concentrating in industries such as
iron  and  steel,  pulp  and  paper.  The  types  of  projects  are  usually  boiler  retrofit,  heat  pump,
variable frequency drive, combustion of waste gas for electricity generation, waste heat recovery
and so on. However, ESCOs are encouraged to perform more in building and transportation
energy conservations. For example, China’s annual building speed is around 2 billion square
meters, where most of them are energy intensive buildings. This illustrates the enormous market
for building energy conservation.
Industry
72 %
Building
26 %
Traffic
2 %
31
3.2.4 Shared Savings model more commonly used in China
In 2007, two-thirds of the total ESCO projects were contracted by shared savings model, where
ESCOs  financed  the  investments  (ASTAE  2008).  Sun  et  al.  (2011)  stated  in  their  article  that
based on the EMCA surveys 2007-2009, 61% of the ESCO projects were done under the shared
savings model and 36% with guaranteed savings. Unfortunately more recent data was not
available, but Romankiewicz et al. (2012) justified that more commonly used model in China is
still shared savings due to the high preferences from government’s incentive policies. All ESCO
projects in the “best practices” were also implemented with shared savings contracts. The split
between ESCOs and customers varied from 20/80 to 40/60. It is predictable that shared savings
model will continue to dominate before the industry reaches the maturation state.
Table 3 ESCO industry statistical data (EMCA)
Year 2006 2010 2011 2012
ESCO companies (registered
with MOF & NDRC)
89 782 1472 (1730) 4175 (2339)
Total value of ESCO industry
(billion RMB)
4.7 83.6 125 165.3
Total number of employees in
ESCO industry
16000 175000 378000 430000
3.2.5 Increasing energy prices in China
High energy prices have a positive effect on the demand for energy efficiency, especially in the
industries. According to Chandlers et al. (2011), China’s prices of coal, electricity and gasoline
are all relatively higher comparing to United States. Shaped by the fast economic growth and
unbalance between the supply and demand, the energy prices will continue to rise in China.
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3.3 Government policies
As stated in the introduction, it is strategically important for the Chinese government to find a
balance between ever-increasing energy demand, energy conservation and environment
protection. Energy conservation through sacrificing economic growth is unrealistic for China.
Therefore Chinese government has highlighted the vigorous need for energy efficiency
improvement. During the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010), China had a goal to reduce energy
intensity by 20 percent. To meet its target, Chinese government had developed comprehensive
energy efficiency policies, such as Top 1000 energy consuming enterprises program, Ten key
energy saving projects program, small plant closures and outdated capacity eliminations
(Romankiewicz et al., 2012). A 20.7 percent drop met this target in reducing energy intensity
from 2006 to 2011(China Daily). China has targeted to reduce energy intensity by 17.3 percent
by 2015 and 31 percent by 2020 from 2010 levels in its 12th five-year plan, and a more ambitious
40-45 percent carbon intensity reduction by 2020 from 2010 levels.
3.3.1 Energy service industry promotion and development
State Council (2010) issued the Document No.25 “Opinions on the accelerating the promotion of
energy management contracts to promote the development of the energy service industry” in
April 2010, which encouraged the acceleration of ESCO industry development. It also promoted
EPC mechanism as one of the main energy efficiency methods, increased financial support and
adopted policy of taxation support. Under the document, central government will support the
development of a number of large integrated energy service companies and the establishment of
a  vibrant  market  by  2012.  The  objective  by  2015  is  to  have  a  relatively  complete  system  of
energy efficiency services, where professional ESCOs have increased their capacities to enhance
the services and to expand into further sectors; to have energy performance contracting as one of
the main ways used for energy efficiency improvements. The Document No.25 targeted the
growth and maturation of the ESCO industry.
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3.3.2 Energy savings fiscal rewards
In June 2010, MOF and NDRC released “Temporary method for management of energy
performance contracting project government budgeted award funds”, a new energy savings fiscal
reward policy. Under the fiscal reward policy, qualified EPC projects done by the registered
ESCOs will be subsidized 240 RMB per ton of coal equivalent energy saved by the central
government, supplemented by at least 60 RMB/tce from local governments. The subsidies from
local government can reach as high as 360 RMB/tce for example in Shanghai, which means that
ESCO  can  claim  up  to  600  RMB  in  total  per  ton  of  coal  equivalent.  The  qualification
requirements for ESCO registration by MOF and NDRC are: (1) Independent legal entity, which
has energy saving services as main business field, (2) Minimum 5 million RMB registered
capital, (3) Good business operation and credit record, and (4) matched technical professionals
and EMC talents. In order to be subsidized, other requirements are a minimum energy savings of
100 tce and maximum of 10 000 tce. The project needs to be done using shared savings model,
where ESCO provides 70 percent of the investments. After the local authorities, MOF and
NDRC have approved the ESCO project, 60% of the fiscal reward will be paid. The rest is
rewarded after the project completion and validated by approved institutions. The total amount of
subsidies released by the central government in 2010 was estimated at around 2 billion RMB.
Table 4 illustrates the fiscal reward policy.
Table 4 Fiscal reward policy for ESCOs
Reward from central government 240 RMB/tce
Additional reward from local government Min. 60 RMB/tce. E.g. Shanghai 360 RMB/tce
and Beijing 260 RMB/tce
Targeted energy savings 100-10 000 tce
Requirements for receiving rewards x ESCO is qualified and registered with
MOF and NDRC
x EPC must be Shared Savings
x ESCO provides at least 70% of the project
investment capital
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3.3.3 Standardization for energy performance contracting
China’s National Standardization Management Committee issued the “General technical rules
for energy performance contracting” in August the same year. The document standardized the
definitions for ESCO and EPC as referred in Chapter 2.2.1. It also provided official contract
example for shared savings ESCO project.
3.3.4 Favorable tax treatments
MOF and General Tax Bureau of China issued the “Related policy questions on value added tax
and income tax with regard to advancing the energy performance contracting industry”, which
took effect in the start of 2011. In the new tax policies, ESCOs enjoy an enterprise income tax
exemption for the first three years from the profit-generating year and 50% reduction for the next
three years. The tax incentives also include exemptions of the business tax for revenue generated
from ESCO projects and the value-added tax (VAT) on the free transfer of the assets to
customers. From customers’ perspective, VAT tax can be deducted as input tax, while business
tax is not deductible (Table 5). The same requirements as in the fiscal reward policy need to be
met in order to enjoy the favorable tax treatments.
Table 5 Business tax & VAT tax
Business
model
Offering Business
type
Payment
of taxes
ESCO company’s tax duties Client
company
ESCO model
(payment of
business tax)
Energy
service
Service Business
tax
Shall  be  paid  based  on  the  sales  of
service (5%), VAT of equipment
purchase not deductible as input tax
Not
deductible
ESCO model
(Payment of
VAT tax)
Energy
service
Service VAT tax Shall be paid based on service duties
(6%), VAT of equipment purchase
can be deducted as input tax
Can be
deducted
as input tax
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3.3.5 Support from EMCA
ESCO committee of the China Energy Conservation Association (EMCA) was established in
2004 during the second phase of the China energy conservation project. EMCA is the national
association of ESCO industry in China. It acts as a platform among ESCOs, energy end-users as
potential customers, government and financial institutions. During the eight years of its operation,
EMCA has been actively promoting the EPC mechanism, supporting ESCO growth, and
establishing a sustainable energy service industry.
3.4 Barriers and drivers for ESCO industry
Edward Vine (2005) has identified some key barriers to the development of ESCO industry
through his international survey conducted in 2002. Other researchers (e.g. Painuly et al., 2003;
Lin et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2008; Gan, 2009; Zhang et al., 2011; Kostka & Shin, 2013) have
found common hurdles in their studies with some specific country-related barriers and drivers.
This subchapter will first outline the barriers and then the drivers for both supply and demand
sides through extensive literature reviews. The classification into market barriers, institutional
barriers, financial barriers and technological barriers presented by Gan (2009) will be used to
summarize this subchapter.
3.4.1 Barriers for the supply side
Majority  of  ESCOs  in  China  are  small  and  medium  scale  enterprises  (SMEs)  and  the  biggest
barrier they are facing is the financial barrier (Gan, 2009; Wang et al., 2008). These SMEs
usually don’t have large amount of capital to support project investments by themselves.
Therefore, well-functioning financial intermediaries are crucial for the successful development
of these ESCOs. Opposite to the ideal situation, the access to capital is limited currently, with
high cost of money reflected in interest rates (Vine, 2005).
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Financial barrier is not driven by the lack of available funding capacity, but rather because that
the lack of awareness and willingness of the financial institutions to fund the future cash flow-
based energy efficiency projects (Lin et al., 2004). As Dresseen (2011) dressed in another words,
it is the inability of ESCO to access the capitals in “commercially attractive” terms. Banks in
China are conservative and require solid collateral as loan guarantees (Gan, 2008). Their
appraisal methods mostly focus on the revenue stream, rather than the saving stream (Painuly et
al., 2003).
Characteristics as long project duration and long input-output cycle make most of ESCOs’
balance sheets weak, which affects negatively in obtaining third party financing. For new
emerging ESCOs, lack of credit history makes the hurdle even higher.
ESCO project may be perceived as risky because they are often non-asset based investments and
collateral is difficult to obtain (Vine, 2005). The high risk is also due to the long duration of
project implementation, which raises the probability of the customer’s default risk. The default
risk is resulted by lack of trust and societal creditworthiness (Kostka & Shin, 2013). There are no
measurement and verification standards and the legal and contract enforcements are generally
weak in China (Gan, 2008).
Many of emerging ESCOs were single equipment providers before. Therefore there also occurs
lack of technical expertise to implement comprehensive ESCO projects through industry process
line and lack of experienced human resources. Since the ESCO industry is quite new, there are
not enough qualified professionals to meet the demand. (IFC 2011)
3.4.2 Barriers for the demand side
On the demand side, energy end-users are generally either not familiar with or not interested in
ESCO concept and EPC mechanism. This is particularly crucial if the decision-makers of energy
end-users lack the awareness of the concept. Even though the awareness of ESCO concept is
increasing in China, the customers may still prioritize on the investments for growth of market
size and increase in revenue. ESCO projects usually have long implementation duration resulting
in long payback periods. While China’s industrial managers commonly expect their investment
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payback to be as short as two years (Chandler et al., 2011). There are no encouragement for
voluntary energy efficiency and low consideration of the benefit aspect for the environment
(Zhang et al., 2011).
The lack of standardized procedures for energy audit, energy savings measurement and
verification creates a barrier for customers also (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2007). This have caused
customers to dispute with the ESCO of the energy audit results and achieved savings in some
cases. The trust was presented as a market barrier for the supply side as well. “Some of the
ESCO customers afraid that the energy efficiency commitment would not function as expected”.
As most of the suppliers in ESCO industry are SMEs, the confidence of them providing
comprehensive services and solutions are low due to the poor capabilities. (Gan, 2008)
Due to the low domestic technology level especially in advanced industry processes. There
occurs a shortage of energy-efficiency technology that is economically affordable. The cost of
technology imports is usually much higher, which lowers the attractiveness of ESCO projects.
3.4.3 Drivers for the supply side
The potential of ESCO market is huge in China, mainly because of the large number of highly
inefficient energy intensive industries. The consensus is that the potential estimates in excess of
100 billion US dollars (IFC 2011). Large market potential is one of the main drivers for energy
efficiency providers to enter the ESCO market.
The support from Chinese government is another driver for ESCO development. Favoring
policies were issued, for example, Document No. 25 called for an accelerated development of
China’s energy saving service industry in 2010. Favorable national tax legislation was also
adapted for ESCOs and monetary subsidies for ESCO projects.
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3.4.4 Drivers for the demand side
Increase in energy prices and intensive competition have made energy end-users more aware of
the growing portion of the energy costs. The reduction in energy costs is the main driver for the
demand side to generally consider energy efficiency improvement.
Many of the energy end-users have the need to replace or upgrade key items of energy-related
equipment due to the issues such as equipment age, operational efficiency, and safety. Because
of the low level of in-house expertise and skills in energy efficiency, outsourcing to ESCOs and
concentrating on core competence may appear as a good option for demand side. The guaranteed
saving promise increases the attractiveness to implement projects as ESCO projects.
For the energy intensive companies, there are also pressures from local authorities to
demonstrate improvements in environmental performance and carbon emissions.
Table 6 summarizes the barriers and drivers discussed in this sub-chapter for research question 2.
We will return to these identified barriers and drivers in the summary of empirical research
results in Chapter six.
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Table 6 Identified barriers & drivers from the ESCO market
Barriers &
Drivers
Barriers from
supply side
Barriers from
demand side
Drivers from
supply side
Drivers from
demand side
Market Lack of trust and
social
creditworthiness,
long project cycle
Low awareness or
lack of
information, other
investment
priorities
Market potential in
energy efficiency
Rising energy
price
Institutional Lack of M&V
standards, weak
legislation or
enforcement
Weak legal
framework, low
environment
protection
consideration
Government
favoring policies,
tax reliefs, fiscal
rewards
Pressure from
authorities
Financial Lack of access to
capital
Lack of proper
credit appraisal
method
Sufficient
financial return of
ESCO projects
No initial
investment
Technological Lack of domestic
technology and
expertise, lack of
experienced
professionals
Fear of technical
risk, lack of
information
Support from
national ESCO
industry
association
Access to
technology and
expertise not
available in-
house
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4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The previous chapter studied the development of ESCO industry in China and the current market
situation. The identified drivers for and barriers to ESCO were summarized into market,
institutional, financial and technological categories. These drivers and barriers are general in
China’s market level. Narrowing down the study from general level to single energy service
contract situations, this chapter will compose the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theoretical
framework to expose the drivers and barriers of ESCO. With this approach, we hope to gain
more complete understanding for the primary research question. This chapter will present the
theoretical framework and elaborate Sorrell’s TCE model for energy service contacting. In the
next chapter, Sorrell’s model will guide this study’s empirical research.
4.1 Transaction cost economics
The existence of economically profitable energy efficiency investments not being realized can be
explained by ”market failure” and ”market barriers”, as this is a widely accepted explanation
coming from transaction cost economics (Kavcic, 2010). There are barriers in ESCO market as
any other market having transactions of goods and services. Jaffe & Stavins (1994) refer market
barriers to any factors that explain why technologies, which appear cost effective at current
prices, are not taken up. Similarly, Sorrell’s definition (SPRU, 2000) of barriers to energy
efficiency was “postulated mechanisms that inhibit investment in technologies that are both
energy efficiency and economically efficient”.
The concept of transaction costs was first introduced by the Nobel Prize winner, economist
Ronald Coase in 1937, which was then developed into a theory by Oliver Williamson in his book
“The economic institutions of capitalism” in 1985. Transaction cost economics assumes that the
transactions are rarely costless and unavailable. As Arrow (1969) had stated: “Market failure is
not absolute, it is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general
impede and in particular cases completely block the formation of market”.
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Williamson (1989) described, “Transaction cost analysis entails an examination of the
comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative
governance structures”. Transaction costs related to energy service contracting are from the
ESCOs’ perspective for example: identifying prospective customers, conducting energy audits,
identifying potential energy savings, contract negotiation and closing, financing. From the
customers’ perspective, costs are such as searching, contracting and monitoring.
Transaction costs have proven difficult to measure, but the determinants offer a general
understanding of the barriers to energy efficiency (Golove & Eto, 1996). Goldman et al. (2005)
argued that the slow diffusion rates of ESCO market could be better understood in terms of the
transaction costs rather than the types of neo-classical market failures.
4.2 Sorrell’s TCE model for energy service contracting
In this decade, Steve Sorrell in his studies developed a theoretical model of energy service
contracting based on the transaction cost economics (TCE) to better understand the underlying
economics and the market barriers. According to Sorrell (2007), contract is viable when “the
expected reduction in the production cost of supplying energy services can more than offset the
transaction cost of negotiating and managing the relationship with the energy service provider”.
4.2.1 Determinants of production cost
The main determinants of production costs are the potential savings in production costs and
aggregate production costs. The technical potential for production cost savings can be achieved
for example by improving management efficiency or by equipment retrofits, refurbishment and
replacement. The ESCOs through the economies of scales, competitive tendering and
performance incentives may offer drivers in customers’ perspective. (Sorrell, 2005)
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4.2.2 Determinants of transaction cost
Cited in Sorrell’s study (2005), Easton Consultants (1999) pointed out that up to 40% of the total
costs in US ESCO performance contracts are transaction costs (See Figure 11). According to
World Bank (2007), if a given enterprise has no experience with a certain type of energy
conservation investment, the time required for staff to secure information, analyze design options,
identify reliable suppliers will induce high transaction costs. Originally, Williamson (1985) in his
book “The economic institutions of capitalism” determined the transaction costs as investment
frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality and opportunistic behavior. In 2005,
Sorrell suggested under the TCE framework four determinants of transaction costs, which were
asset specificity, task complexity, competitiveness and institutional context.
Figure 11 Percentage of transaction costs (Easton Consultants, 1999; cited in Sorrell, 2005)
Asset specificity
Asset specificity and task complexity are two project specific determinants of transaction cost.
The specificity of physical and human assets required to provide the energy service is valued by
the possibility of alternative use (Sorrell 2005). For example, money as liquidity is a non-specific
asset, while the equipment integrated to customer’s process systems is specific and hard to
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transfer. Originally Williamson (1985) presented the term “asset specificity” as “specialized
assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive value”. Sorrell defined three types of
specificities: site specificity related to the relocating possibility of investments and the resale
value. Physical asset specificity in performance contracting is related to the sunk costs of pre-
contract energy audit. Human asset specificity is related to the specialized knowledge and
expertise to provide the energy services. Mainly from the ESCOs’ perspective, asset specificity
creates a problem of safeguarding against opportunism. The higher degree of asset specificity
results in higher vulnerability of investing side to be exposed to opportunism behavior of the
other side, therefore asset specificity increases transaction costs (Sorrell 2005).
Task complexity
According to Sorrell (2005), the task complexity refers to difficulty degree of energy services in
general  and  the  costs  of  specifying  and  monitoring  the  contract  terms  and  conditions.  If  the
conditions are poorly defined, it may expose one of the contracting sides for opportunistic
behavior (Kavcic, 2010). Increasing level of task complexity also generates greater
environmental and behavioral uncertainties. Hereby environmental uncertainty refers to the
changes in internal and external factors, which creates an adaptation problem. Behavioral
uncertainty refers to the increase of asymmetry information between ESCOs and customers,
which creates a measurement problem. Both of the uncertainties lead to direct and opportunity
costs, which reflects to higher transaction costs.
Competitiveness
Competitiveness  is  one  of  the  two  transaction  cost  determinants  that  is  common  to  all  ESCO
projects. Institutional context described in the next paragraph is the other one. Competitiveness
of the energy service market was presented as the third determinant of transaction costs. The
potential of opportunistic behavior increases when competitors in the market are limited. On the
contrary, in the competed and contestable market, opportunism has no implications and should
result in the decrease of transaction costs.
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Institutional context
The political, economic, legal and financial frameworks were summarized as institutional
context. Under supportive contexts, the transaction costs are lower. Sorrell (2005) identified that,
these supportive “encouragements” could be such as information dissemination; standardization
of public procurement procedures, monitoring and verification protocols and contract models;
accreditation of ESCOs; and consultancy.
Figure 12 TCE model for energy service contracting (Sorrell, 2005)
The figure above summarizes Sorrell’s theoretical model. The favorable determinants of
production cost are high potential saving for customers and low aggregate production cost. On
the transaction cost side, favorable circumstances are low asset specificity and low task
complexity, while externally high competition in ESCO market and high institutional support.
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Under the TCE model, Sorrell (2005) also suggested six hypotheses (Figure 13) to be tested
through empirical research for the future studies. Action was taken in the empirical research of
this study to test the effects of production and transaction cost determinants in resulting of viable
ESCO projects; and to find out the perceived drivers and barriers from the perspective of ESCOs
(See research question 3). We continue with the empirical research in the next chapter.
Figure 13 Hypotheses regarding the viability of energy service contracts (Sorrell, 2005)
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5 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Several studies have indicated that ESCOs are far from fully utilizing their potential. The ESCO
literature provided reasons for it from neo-classical, behavioral and organizational point of views
(SPRU 2000), but there are no empirical research done in China under the transaction cost
economic framework. Therefore, it would be beneficial to identify the important barriers and
drivers of Chinese ESCOs explored through the TCE framework. This chapter introduces first
the data collection method chosen for the empirical research, then the research design and
process. The findings will be presented in the next chapter. The transaction cost economics
framework  by  Sorrell  (2007)  serves  as  the  starting  point  for  the  interview  design  and  the
questions are formed based on the determinants of production and transaction cost to identify the
perceived barriers and drivers.
5.1 Research design
5.1.1 Semi-structured interviews
Järvinen (2004) described the interview as a conversation between researcher and interviewee to
elicit valuable information from the interviewee. Interview was chosen as the data gathering
method for this empirical research.  According to Given (2008), the semi-structured interview is
a qualitative data collection strategy that involves researcher asking interviewees predetermined
but open-ended questions. By asking open-ended questions, interviewees are usually encouraged
to give opinions and perceptions in their own wordings. Semi-structured interviews provide more
control over the topic comparing to unstructured interviews but are more flexibility than closed
interviews or questionnaires (Given, 2008). This also reduces interviewees’ self-reporting nature
in data collection. Generally, researcher plans the interview flow beforehand with list of
predetermined questions. Based on each interview situation, researcher may vary the wording
and the order of questions to create the most natural conversation (Eriksson and Kovalainen,
2008). The goal is to gain qualitative information for the research questions related to the
concepts or phenomenon under investigation (Given, 2008).
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5.1.2 Sample of interviewees
The selected interviewees should be somewhat homogenous and share critical similarities related
to the research question (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). In this empirical research, six
ESCOs  were  selected.  Five  of  the  six  sample  ESCOs  were  registered  with  NDRC  and  MOF.
Additionally, these selected ESCOs represented the technology-oriented and market-oriented
ESCOs, private companies and group subsidiaries, ESCOs in both industry and building sectors.
By covering different type of ESCOs, we believe it will increase the general validity and
reliability of this empirical research.
5.1.3 Formulation of interview questions
The interview opens with introducing to the topic and asking permission for tape recording. In
the background section, general information about the interviewees’ companies is asked. The
background questions are divided into main questions as company size, offerings, ESCO projects
and ESCO status. These questions are continued with possible follow-ups and prompted with
specifying questions.
The six determinants of production and transaction cost (potential savings in production cost,
aggregate production costs, asset specificity, task complexity, competitiveness and institutional
contexts) are used as the themes in the pre-determinate open-ended questions in the following six
sections. Under each determinant, 7-point Likert scale scores from entirely disagree to entirely
agree are used to test Sorrell’s hypothesis (See figure 13) among the ESCOs as opinion questions.
This can be seen as adductive reasoning, where theories prior the data collections are validated
through the data (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). Use of 7-point Likert scale can minimize
interviewees’ extremeness aversion behavior.
To explore the perceived barriers and drivers, several open-ended direct questions will be asked
around each determinant. After direct questioning, follow-up questions are specified to elaborate
interviewees’ answers. Direct questions’ formulation is influenced by Sorrell’s (2005) UK
48
survey design (See Appendix A). Despite that Sorrell’s survey attempt ended with statistically
insignificant results caused by low response rate, it still act as the starting point for this empirical
research to test the hypotheses and find out the perceived barriers and drivers. The entire
interview plan can be found in Appendix B.
5.2 Research process
Face-to-face interviews were conducted, since it allows the access to nonverbal information
expressed by the interviewees. According to Shuy (2003), by being in the same space with the
interviewee, researcher can better establish a good rapport for more fruitful data collection. The
interviews were conducted in China between March and April 2013. The interviews lasted
between 60 to 120 minutes. Place where interviews took place were in the Capital area of China.
All interviews were recorded under the interviewees’ permissions and all interviewees remained
anonymous in this report. A total of six semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior
management level representatives of these companies, examining the size, scope and nature of
their business, contract types, market competitiveness, transaction costs, government policy
initiatives, barriers and drivers for contracting. Due to the language barriers among Chinese
ESCOs’ representatives, the interviews of this study were conducted in Chinese. Therefore, the
transcription was highly dependence on author’s ability to understand, interpret the verbal and
nonverbal information provided by the interviewees from Chinese to English. The interviews
were transcribed, reread and combined with notes during interviews and immediate impressions
written down after the interview situations for research analysis and result presentation. Next
chapter will present and summarize the empirical findings from these interviews.
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6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The empirical research results aim in providing answers to the primary research question: under
Sorrell’s transaction cost economics (TCE) framework, justify the effects of the production and
transaction cost determinants in resulting of viable ESCO project. How Chinese ESCOs have
perceived the previously identified drivers and barriers under the TCE framework? The result
presentation will follow the sequence of interview plan (See Appendix B).
6.1 Background
As described in the research design, background information was asked in the start of each
interview. From the six interviewed ESCOs, four were subsidiaries of Group Corporation and
two were private companies. Four of them focused on customers in building sector and two
operated in industry sector. Two were registered with NDRC & MOF in the first batch, two in
the third batch, one in the fourth batch and one yet without registration. The headcount varied
from 20 to over 900. Compared in size, five were SMEs and one was listed company. The
overview of interviewed ESCOs’ background is listed in Appendix C in chronological order.
6.2 Determinants of production cost
Sorrell’s framework was originally developed to assess the viability to entry an energy service
contract. According to Sorrell (2007), the total savings in production costs must be greater than
the transaction costs in order to have an economically viable energy service contracting. The two
production cost determinants were the potential savings in production costs and the aggregate
production costs. In Sorrell’s model, these production cost determinants were highly project
specific and mainly influenced by the size and nature of the customer. Notwithstanding, we
included the determinants of production cost to investigate the barriers and drivers to ESCOs.
Since the focus will be on the determinants of transaction cost in the following paragraphs,
production costs will be only briefly explored.
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6.2.1 Potential savings in production cost
Figure 14 Opinions on potential savings in production cost
All interviewees agreed to some extent with Sorrell’s view that the larger the saving in
production costs, the greater the viability. The saving in production costs relates to energy cost
saving potential through technical and organizational improvements compared to the historical
performance. The size variable had an impact on ESCOs’ opinions in these interviews. For
smaller ESCO with limited capacity, customer’s large technical potential for production cost
savings may not necessary is a favorable determinant, especially if ESCO cannot meet the
requirements to realize the potential. Therefore from ESCOs’ perspective, the viability is related
to the size of ESCO.
Under this theme, we asked how ESCOs have perceived customers’ expectations toward ESCO
projects. The purpose was to examine how ESCOs perceptions of drivers for customers fit to the
previously identified drivers from demand side in chapter 3.4.4. The results show that the
perceptions from Chinese ESCOs correspond with the identified drivers.
All interviewees agreed that the economic benefit from energy cost savings is the largest driver
for their customers. Beside this, one ESCO also highlighted that “The customers expect
minimum disruption to their normal operations during the ESCO project implementation”.
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ESCO is more viable, when the technical
potential for production cost savings are large.
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The private-owned enterprises are generally more ready for ESCO projects, due to the
expectation of economic gains through energy cost savings. Majority of the interviewed ESCOs
described the energy conservation motivation of state-owned industries and governmental
buildings as passive. In China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) usually still practice planned
economy. The managers of SOEs also hold concurrent posts in the government. Between these
two roles, there occurs a conflicting interest. The savings in energy cost is not the primary
objective for factory managers, because lower expenditure could mean that the next year’s
budget will be pruned.
There are pressures from local authorities to demonstrate improvements in environmental
performance and carbon emissions. Large-scale enterprises are more likely supervised by the
environmental authorities. “It poses also a dilemma for local authorities as the large-scale
enterprise may also be the greatest single source of taxation for the city. Therefore local
authorities sometimes doesn’t press the environmental issues effectively enough”, said by one of
the interviewees.
In the building sector, the energy-saving potential of individual building is very limited. ESCOs
have to seek opportunities to bundle the buildings for better viability. The economies of scale
will be discussed next.
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6.2.2 Aggregate production costs
Figure 15 Opinions on aggregate production costs
Sorrell (2005) expected that ESCO’s advantages in terms of economies of scale fall as the size of
energy end-user increases. The size of client is referred to aggregate production costs for energy
services for all the sites owned by the client. This hypothesis was somewhat unclear among
interviewees. From one point of view, one interviewee states that “shouldn’t it be opposite, the
bigger aggregate production costs, the greater the viability”. Beside the customer’s size variable,
the perception was also affected by the size of ESCO. Smaller ESCOs tended to disagree with
this hypothesis in these interviews.
Due to economies of scale, ESCOs may have an advantage comparing to customers’ in-house
performance. This point of view was enquired through the interviews and the results confirmed
that most of the interviewees believe that they outperform customer’s in-house provision with
more extensive access to information, advanced core technology, specialized professionals and
efficient  management  skills.  For  ESCO  companies  under  the  umbrella  of  corporation  groups,
they are more privilege to enjoy the economies of scale.
Entirely
Disagree
Mostly
Disagree
Somewhat
Disagree
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
Somewhat
Agree
Mostly
Agree
Entirely
Agree
ESCO is more viable, when the aggregate
production costs within the customer are small.
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6.3 Determinants of transaction cost
Sorrell defined the four determinants influencing the transaction costs as asset specificity, task
complexity, competitiveness and institutional context of the market. Among these, the first two
were project specific and remaining two were market specific. The barriers and drivers perceived
under the market specific determinants offer more descriptive power as they may be generalized
across the common market.
6.3.1 Asset specificity
Figure 16 Opinions on asset specificity
In Sorrell’s (2005) hypothesis, as asset specificity increases transaction costs also increase,
making the ESCO contracting less viable. Hereby, asset specificity refers to the “sunk costs” by
physical and human assets prior to and during the term of contracting that are nontransferable or
with little savage value. Interviewees unanimously shared this opinion. During the interviews,
we asked about the customization level of ESCOs’ offering, the knowledge and expertise level of
ESCOs to perform the projects and the possible energy audit investments. From these questions,
we wanted to examine, how Chinese ESCOs have perceived asset complexity as a barrier or
driver.
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assets required is low.
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ESCO business is technology-intensive. Continuous technology improvement is an important
factor for ESCOs to maintain core competitiveness. To achieve this, the stable core technical
personnel are the bases. All interviewed ESCOs have strong internal knowledge and expertise,
but most of them also have close cooperation with external experts from education and research
institutions. The need to acquire information from outside wasn’t seen as a barrier by the
interviewees, but the difficulties of obtaining core technical personnel was raised by one of the
interviewed ESCOs, “While the market competition becomes fiercer, company has to
continuously satisfy key employees intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in order to keep them in-
house”. At the moment, the rise of labor costs in China has still relatively small impact on
companies’ profitability.
Specificity of assets varies between ESCO projects. Depended on ESCOs product and service
offerings, there was a polarization of the customization level. For example in buildings’ lighting
solutions, the product (LED lights) offered to customers is a standardized mass product. On the
other hand, waste heat power generation solutions were highly site specific and required detailed
customization. One of the interviewees summarized that “generally all products and services
need to be customized to fit different customers’ needs. This can’t be seen as a barrier, since the
possible risk can be avoided through proper contract terms”.
The pre-contract energy audit is necessary for all ESCO projects. For smaller projects, it may
end up as “sunk” cost that never pays off. For large projects, ESCOs may also offer the energy
audit as a separate service to avoid the economic loss from not contracting, but it is very rare.
Some of the interviewees said that “the pre-contract energy audits are made free-of-charge,
because this has been the unwritten industry practice”. The pre-contract energy audits are mostly
done by the ESCOs themselves, but some customers may also request third-party institutions to
perform the energy audits.
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6.3.2 Task complexity
Figure 17 Opinions on task complexity
Sorrell (2005) expected the transaction costs for specifying and monitoring ESCO contracts to
increase when the task features greater complexity. This was generally agreed by the
interviewees, but one has questioned that “in the real life, if the task is simple and
straightforward, there would be no need for ESCO since energy end-user can complete it itself”.
The disagreement was related to the general complexity of the task and its effect on energy
service contract’s viability. From the contract specifying and monitoring aspect, the opinions
were consistent with the hypothesis. We re-contacted the interviewee with divergent opinion to
ensure this (25.04.2013).
Under the task complexity determinant, the overall complexity of ESCO projects was discovered.
Theoretically, high complexity of the project exposed one side to act opportunistically. Based on
the responses of interviewed ESCOs, we see that the ESCO projects are generally complex in
nature. Technologically, it requires professional teams in both engineering and construction.
More importantly, indicated by one of the interviewees, “For a single project to proceed in China,
it needs approvals from over 20 government authorities within their state level, provincial level
and local level departments, meaning over 200 stamps. These government authorities are for
example national development and reform commission, ministry of environmental protection,
ministry of information and technology and different departments under the ministries.” Another
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Chinese ESCO argued that the view might be exaggerated, but agreed “public relations have
always had an important role in doing business in China. Chinese ESCOs have to put great
efforts and invest big amount of resources to make the stakeholders satisfied”.
As we mentioned in chapter 3.3.2, Chinese government has issued a model contract for ESCO
projects in the “General Technical Rules for Energy Performance Contracting”. The model
contract has been widely used among ESCOs and parties are satisfied with the terms defined in
the model contract. The standardized contract model by the government is agreed as a driver by
the interviewed ESCOs.
The difficulty of monitoring and verification in ESCO projects was previously identified as one
of the barriers for both supply and demand sides. This aspect was investigated through direct
questions and ESCOs’ opinions had polarized on this issue. Some of ESCOs hadn’t experience
any difficulty with customers in energy saving monitoring and verification, while others had
undergone challenges. The characteristics of energy conservation technology are one of the main
reasons. “For us, energy saving amount is measured and validated through electric energy metric.
It is simple, accurate and transparence”, said by ESCO, which found M&V straightforward. On
the other hand, another ESCO stated, “In the building sector, the amount of annual energy saving
is highly influenced by the external climate. Customers are sometimes diffused of the energy
savings by either ESCO project or climate change”. “Beside the external uncertainty factors,
another reason for M&V difficulty is caused by inaccurate basic data provided by the customers”,
reasoned by another interviewee. National monitoring and verification standards for different
sectors were strongly desired by those ESCOs facing difficulties.
In industrial ESCO projects, the energy saving potentials is interconnected with energy end-users’
production performances. Before contracting ESCOs also have to carefully evaluate the
performance  risks  of  their  customers.  With  predefined  terms  and  conditions,  ESCOs can  avoid
failure caused by customers’ production shortage.
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6.3.3 Competitiveness
Figure 18 Opinions on competitiveness
Hypothesis of “ESCO is more viable, when the market is competitive” found divergent echo
among interviewees. “From ESCO’s point of view, increased competition inspires us to invest in
research & development and to generate more efficient and effective energy efficiency
technology for the market, but it also has negative impacts such as cutthroat competition in
project biddings” commented by one of the interviewees. Competitive market made customers’
bargaining power stronger and ESCOs will face difficulties in survival without self-developed
technologies or own customer base. Customer relationships with strong mutual trust also reduce
the possible negative effects to ESCOs. These were the main variables behind the divergent
opinions.
Under this theme, the interview questions investigated the underlying market competition in-
depth. The direct questions were asked about the competitors of the interviewed ESCOs, the
general competition in the industry, the market entry requirements and the future expectations.
ESCOs perceived differently about their direct competitors. For ESCOs with more
standardization and lower technology, they have found more competitors with comparable
offerings. Regarding the competition in the industry, ESCOs agreed that the market competition
is getting fiercer; as many ESCOs are newly established under the favoring policies and foreign
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ESCOs have targeted China to be their next “cash cow”. “The competition is intensive and there
are even copycats in the market”, one ESCO complained.
Some of the interviewees perceived that as the early entrants, some ESCOs enjoyed the market
dominance due to the demonstrative effect of previously successful projects. Although there are
some entry barriers for new players in terms of capital, technology, human resource, operation
management and value chain integration, the increased market awareness of ESCO and market
demand attract more and more competitors. “The requirements for ESCO are relatively low and
many new players are market-oriented without any core technology”, pointed out by one of the
interviewees. Self-developed core technology and reputation offer some differentiation edge, but
if the early entrants cannot secure their financing channels and maintain their technology
advantages, it will be difficult for them to consolidate the market dominance.
In the follow up questions, the perceptions of competitiveness as either a barrier or driver were
elaborated. Generally, interviewees have received both conducive and inhibitory effects. “While
rivalry get more intense between ESCOs, it push everyone for continuous development and can
result in better solutions for the customers”, stated by one of the interviewees. “On the other
hand, our pricing is negatively affected by the increased competition, shrinking the profit
margins. In the long run, it may be a barrier” added by another ESCO.
“The market positions may be reshuffled in near future. The trend is toward super ESCOs
operated by the large SOEs. Small and private-owned ESCOs will be merged and acquired”,
estimated by one interviewees. Government authorities have also started the annual examination
with registered ESCOs. Registered ESCOs with less than two ESCO projects or 100 tce savings
per year will have their status withdrawn. Most of interviewees agreed with government’s
attitude to tighten the requirements. All ESCOs were confidence that the ESCO industry will
reach its full potential in the near future.
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6.3.4 Institutional contexts
Figure 19 Opinions on institutional contexts
Sorrell stated that the transaction costs are also depended upon the institutional contexts. The
institutional context determinant was divided into political, legal, economic and financial
frameworks. According to the hypothesis, ESCO is more viable, when the relevant institutional
contexts are supportive. Interviewees had a consensus and agreed upon this hypothesis. The
differences between mostly and entirely agree can be understood by extremeness aversion
behavior.
The existing barriers and drivers from industrial and governmental sources suggested that
government’s supportive policies have a positive impact on ESCOs. Through the direct questions
about these driving policies, we understood that interviewed ESCOs were aware of the
government’s supporting policies. The tax incentives and fiscal rewards were also available, but
the enforcement of government policies in the local level was sometimes delayed. Some of the
interviewees were satisfied with the current supporting force from the government, while others
hoped for yet stronger fiscal rewards. Despite the availability of the subsidies, some had
surprisingly stated that the ability to enjoy them was highly dependence on the personal network
and relations with the related government departments. As it was said by one of interviewees
“There are thousands of ESCO projects meeting the subsidy requirements, but government’s
reward budget is  only enough for some of them. In order to be one of the companies receiving
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the subsidies, ESCO needs to have strong network with the government.” Although the network
was raised as essential in doing business in China by interviewees, it shared opinions of its actual
role as driver or barrier in ESCO business. Some argued that “The network could decrease the
negotiation cost and increase the mutual trust, but it is not the only element needed for success”.
Despite of some complexity to receive the tax incentives, the benefit of income tax exemptions
could be very large. For one interviewed ESCO “the tax incentives accounted for over 30% of
the annual net profits”. ESCOs enjoy an enterprise income tax exemption for the first three years
from the profit-generating year and 50% reduction for the second three years. After the expiry of
the preferential tax policies, ESCOs’ operating results may be adversely affected due to the
increase in income tax expenses.
After the companies received the fiscal rewards, there were differences between ESCOs as how
they managed the rewards. Some ESCOs gave them directly to their customers as a negotiation
mechanism to attract customers. Some ESCOs shared them with customers under a predefined
split.  Some included the subsidies as a discount factor in pricing.  There were also ESCOs who
kept it all to themselves. The interviewed ESCOs hoped for easier approval process in the future.
All in all, the rewarding policies weren’t seen as a decisive element in project contracting. As the
subsidies are mutually exclusive, receiving the ESCO subsidies may result in not enjoying other
rewards.
The general legal framework was explored by asking about the legal enforcement, contracting
and M&V standards. The public procurement procedures were also one of the direct questions.
As  a  developing  country,  China’s  legal  system  is  still  far  from  reaching  its  perfection.  “In  the
legal environment, the principle of good faith needs to improve. Noblemen respect and obligate
the consensual contract, but there are also villains acting opportunistically harming the mutual
benefits”, indicated by one interviewee. Right self-guarding costs in China are high. The course
of a judicial processing is economically heavy, complex and time-consuming. “For ESCO
companies, protection through legal recourse is the last and least pleasant option”, same
interviewee continued. The business environment in China is highly dynamic and the lifecycle of
enterprise could be very short. “Merger and acquisition happens every day, especially for small-
and medium size enterprises. Therefore there are little payment guarantees and debt collection
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costs sometimes more resources than the core business”, complained by one of the interviewees.
ESCOs have to carefully evaluate their customers before contracting, which increases the
transaction costs. The national M&V standard was yet established and the international
performance measurement and verification protocol was poorly applied in China. The public
procurement procedures differ between provinces. Depending on the location of project, ESCOs
have to familiarize with the local practices.
Regarding the economic framework, effects of external factors as energy price, financial crisis or
economic downturn were enquired. All interviewed ESCOs agreed that the increase in energy
prices has a driving boost toward ESCO industry. “For example, the coal price per ton was 455
RMB in January 2006 and was up to 900 RMB per ton with an 87 per cent growth rate”, one of
the interviewees stated. Energy end-users’ demand for energy services follows the increase of
energy prices. The effect of economic downturn has two sides. For energy end-users, they may
shift their priority toward energy conservation while production demand is weak. But then, if the
financial stability of customer could not be secured during the depression, it will certainly cause
negative effect to ESCOs.
Under the financial framework, the access to capitals was previously seen as a major barrier for
ESCOs among industrial and governmental sources. The questions were formulated to
investigate ESCOs’ financing channels and the awareness of financial institution toward ESCO.
ESCO is a capital-intensive business, which needs substantial capital investments in order to
achieve continuous growth. If the company cannot acquire the financial funding required for the
project investments, the negative impact will be strong. The company will not only confront
delays in project construction schedule, but also facing the claims by customers causing
economic losses. It is generally easier for large corporate group to access to capitals. Currently
the financial institutions are getting more aware of the ESCO concept and the willingness to
participate has also increased. Some commercial banks have also established offices specialized
in energy conservation project financing. “Of course, without proper guarantees, the financing
through financial institution is still a sea of troubles” reminded one of the interviewees.
Answered by another ESCO, 20% of their project investments are funded by their own capitals
from the shareholders and previous projects’ profits, while the rest from the financial institutions.
Other ESCOs had also similar arrangement as self-funding for smaller projects (investments less
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than 10 million RMB) and FI financing for larger ones. With the FI, the arrangements were that
future energy savings related cash flows and invested equipment as collaterals, sometimes also
the company’s equity and shareholders’ personal properties as guarantees. To secure the
financing channel, some SMEs have also chosen to finance through capital market by launching
in stock exchange.
We have discussed the results from interviews under Sorrell’s TCE model. Next subchapter will
summarize these results to answer this study’s primary question. To summarize the findings
related to barriers and drivers from empirical research, we will reuse the classification into
market, institutional, financial and technological categories in Table 7.
6.4 Summary of findings
6.4.1 Sorrell’s hypotheses
From the sample population testing Sorrell’s hypotheses, we found that there are some relevant
variables affecting the opinions toward these hypotheses. In the two production cost
determinants, both ESCO’s and customer’s size were the variables dividing opinions. Smaller
ESCOs tended to disagree with the hypotheses. The relation between ESCO and customer
shaped by bargaining power and trust also impacted the opinion toward market competitiveness.
Another variable related to the opinions of market competitiveness is that whether the ESCO was
technology or market-oriented. ESCOs without own technology or customer base were divergent
with this hypothesis. Sorrell’s explanatory model for energy service contract’s viability could be
completed with these variables.
6.4.2 Market drivers and barriers
The information dissemination and education mainly by the industry association have increased
the awareness among ESCO’s shareholders. Despite the increased public awareness, the
motivation and pressure of energy end users for energy conservation still have space for
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improvement. This concerns especially SOEs in industry sector and public institutions in
building sector. The increased market awareness of ESCO and market demand attracts more
competitors. Fiercer competition reduces the profit margins and increases the pressure for
customer seeking. The market entry requirements are relatively low, but the government has
started  some  actions  such  as  annual  status  examination.  Some  ESCOs  rely  on  one  single
corporate customer. High dependency on a single customer source increases the business risk of
those ESCOs. China’s business environment is highly dynamic, frequent M&V and even
bankruptcy increase the uncertainty for lengthy ESCO contracts. From another point of view, the
uncertainty is also reflected by the poor credit system and improper societal creditworthiness
environment. ESCO’s reputation and demonstrative effect of previously successful ESCO
project are driving forces in the market. External factors as increasing energy prices and
economic downturn are also positive drivers from ESCOs’ perspectives. Expensive use of energy
and priority shift from business expansion toward cost reduction increases the interests in energy
efficiency and ESCO.
6.4.3 Institutional drivers and barriers
From the end of 11th five years plan, Chinese government began to strongly promote the ESCO
industry with concrete targets and supportive policies. The fiscal rewards and favoring taxation
are essential drivers for ESCOs. Unfortunately the subsidy approval and receiving processes are
sometimes long and complex. The enforcement of government policies in the local level is also
sometimes delayed. The difficulty in enjoying government’s supportive policies substantially
lessens the driving effect. ESCOs have to have strong relations with related authorities in China.
The existing legal framework offers relatively little protection for stakeholders and there are
often little payment guarantees. The right self-guarding is also economically heavy and time-
consuming process, being a barrier. China’s National Standardization Management Committee
has established a standard contract model, which has been widely applied in ESCO projects. This
has helped stakeholders to decrease the transaction cost of contracting. The monitoring and
verification standard has yet established, which has inhibitory effect for performance contracting.
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The bid procedures vary among the regions, the ESCOs have to familiarize with the local
practices in different projects.
6.4.4 Financial drivers and barriers
Awareness of financial institutions has increased due to information dissemination and some
commercial banks have also established departments specializing in energy conservation project
financing. There occur still difficulties for SMEs in accessing the capitals, especially when they
lack proper collaterals. For ESCOs with limited circulating funds and shortage in financing
channels, shared savings model is very hard to implement. The successful precedent of SME
ESCO launching in Shenzhen Stock Exchange offers an alternative to secure the financing
resource. Without access to capital, the growth of ESCO will be severely constrained.
6.4.5 Technological drivers and barriers
In the technology-intensive ESCO business, the technical professionals are the cores. Lack of
experienced personnel or difficulty in obtaining them will result as a barrier. The active act of
EMCA in training program arrangements has fostered the capabilities of ESCO professionals.
The general technical innovation level in China is low. For the supplementary devices, the
quality of domestic products is not high enough to meet the requirements. It is essential for
technology-oriented ESCOs to invest in R&D and continuously improve their core technology.
Strong internal technology and expertise are driving elements for ESCOs. Cooperation
opportunities with experts from authoritative education and research institutions will boost the
overall industry. On the other hand, the characteristics as high customization and “free” pre-
contract energy audit in the ESCO projects increases the risks and may evolve as a barrier if not
managed properly. The summary of findings is illustrated in next table.
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Table 7 Perceived barriers and drivers from ESCOs’ perspective
Barriers & Drivers Barriers from ESCOs Drivers from ESCOs
Market x Intense competition for
customers and technical
experts
x Decrease in profit margins
x Information dissemination
and public awareness
x Uncertainty in market
dynamics with abrupt
M&As
x Lack of trust and social
creditworthiness
x Market potential in energy
efficiency
x Pressures from authorities for
intensive energy end-users
x Economies of scale
x Reputation and
demonstrative effect of
successful projects
x Increasing energy prices
x Economic downturn
Institutional x Complexity in project
approval from authorities
x Long and complex approval
process for subsidies
x Costs from public affairs
and government relations
x Lack of M&V standards
x Weak legal enforcement and
high right self-guarding
costs
x Government favoring
policies as fiscal rewards and
tax exemptions
x Standard contract model
Financial x Difficulties in accessing
capitals
x Shortage in financing
channels
x Increased awareness of FI
x Sufficient economical return
of ESCO projects
x Launch in stock exchange
Technological x Lack of domestic
technology and expertise
x High customization
x Sunk cost of pre-contract
energy audit
x Low technical innovation
level
x Strong internal knowledge
and expertise
x Cooperation with experts
from education and research
institutions
x Support from national ESCO
industry association
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7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This study clarified the terminology that falls under Energy Service Company (ESCO) and
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC). By reviewing the extant literature, it increased the
overall understanding of ESCO development in China from past to the present state. This study
also identified the drivers for and barriers to ESCO market discussed in industrial and
government sources. In the empirical part, semi-constructed interviews were done with six
ESCOs in China. The interview data were collected, taped, transcribed, coded, analyzed and the
findings were discussed. In terms of theoretical implications, this study contributed to knowledge
about the ESCO drivers and barriers in China by applying the transaction cost economics
framework. According to the current knowledge, this was first empirical investigation about
ESCO barriers in China through the determinants of transaction cost.
7.1 Limitations
This study, as most of the studies, was limited both in time and resource. From the recommended
list  of  ESCOs  from  EMCA  and  list  of  registered  ESCO  by  NDRC  &  MOF,  we  had  a  large
candidate list. It was still hard to arrange meetings with Chinese senior level managers under the
“student” status; therefore helps from Finnish Trade Center in Beijing were applied. Due to the
difficulties confronted in interview arrangement, this study was able only to conduct six
interviews. The importance of the drivers and barriers discussed is mostly applicable at the place
and time where the interviews were conducted, and therefore the findings may not be applicable
to other countries. In this study, the interviews were conducted in the Capital area of China,
Beijing.
For the theoretical framework selected, Sorrell’s TCE model has one of the limitations. The
model excluded the role of trust in mitigating opportunistic behaviour resulting in less
transaction costs (Sorrell, 2005). Kostka & Shin (2013) pointed out “the success of the ESCO
model in China depends critically on the formation of trustworthy relationships between ESCOs
and potential customers”. In the empirical research, interviewees also raised societal
trustworthiness several time.
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7.2 Future research
This study concentrated on investigating ESCOs’ drivers and barriers purely from the economic
point of view by using the Transaction Cost Economics theoretical framework. For the future
research, the problem can also be approached from different disciplines. For example from the
cultural point of view, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions such as power distance, uncertainty
avoidance and long-term vs. short-term orientations, may shape the decisions between ESCOs
and customers.
In this study, we had glanced off the issue that customers may also enjoy other mutually
exclusive subsidies than ESCO rewards in energy conservation projects. It would be interesting
to investigate deeper the trade-offs in decision-making for project implementation using ESCO
contracting or traditional equipment and service purchasing.
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Appendix B
Interviewplan
Introduction









Background

Mainquestions Follow-upquestions Specifyingquestions
Whatisthesizeofyour
company?

Whatisthenumberofemployees? Howmanyenergyserviceprofessionals?
Whatareyourenergy
efficiency(EE)products
andservices?

Towhomyouofferyourproductsandservices? Publicorprivatesectors,industry,buildingortrafficsectors?
HaveyoudoneanyESCO
projectsusingEPC?


Ifyes,Howmuch,innumberandsize? Underthesharedsavingsmodelorguaranteedsavingmodel?
Areyouregisteredwith
MOFƬNDRCforESCO-
status?

Ifyes,when?Ifno,intentionto? 

Potentialsavingsinproductioncost

Opinionquestions Directquestions Follow-upquestions
ESCOismoreviable,
whenthetechnical
potentialforproduction
costsavingsarelarge.

WhatcancustomersexpectfromESCOproject?

Significantenergysavings,reducingenergycosts?

Duringtheinterview,wouldliketodiscussaboutthedriversforandbarrierstoESCO.Withthistopicinmind,wouldlikefirsttoaskthepermissiontorecordourconversation.Youandyourcompanywillbekeptanonymousandconfidentialatalltimes.Ifyouareinterested,cansendthefinalreportofthisstudywhenitispublished.
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Aggregateproductioncosts

Opinionquestions Directquestions Follow-upquestions
ESCOismoreviable,
whentheaggregate
productioncostswithin
thecustomeraresmall.

Doesyourcompanyhaveeconomiesofscaleadvantage? 

Assetspecificity

Opinionquestions Directquestions Follow-upquestions
ESCOismoreviable,
whenthespecificityof
theassetsrequiredis
low.
Sitespecificity:Theofferinghastobecustomizedforcustomers?

Ifyes,doyouseethisasbarrier?Humanassetspecificity:Needtoacquirelotofknowledgeandexpertiseforprojects?
Doesyourcompanyhavesufficientinformationorneedtoacquirefromoutside?Barrier?Physicalassetspecificity:Needtoinvestinpre-contractenergyaudits? Byyourself(ESCO)orthroughthird-party?Barrier?



 
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Taskcomplexity

Opinionquestions Directquestions Follow-upquestions
ESCOismoreviable,
whenthedifficultyin
specifyingand
monitoringcontractsis
low.
HowcomplexaretheESCOprojects? Singleequipmentreplacementorentireprocessorin-between?
Howwellcantheofferingbedefinedinthecontract? Doesyourcompanyusethecontractmodelinthe“technicalrules”?
Isitstraightforwardtomeasuretheperformance? Ifnot,doyouseethisasbarrier?
Isitstraightforwardtoverifythesavingsachieved?

Ifnot,doyouseethisasbarrier?
Doesthemonitoringandverification(M&V)requiregreatefforts?

Ifyes,doyouseethisasbarrier?

Competitiveness

Opinionquestions Directquestions Follow-upquestions
ESCOismoreviable,
whenthemarketis
competitive.
ArethereotherESCOsprovidingcomparableservice?

Whatistheeffectofreputation?Howdoesitaffectsyourpricing?HowcompetitiveistheESCOmarketinChina?


Doyouseethisasbarrierordriver?
Aretherehighrequirementformarketentry?

Ifyes,what?Doyouseethisasbarrier?
HowdoyouseethefuturedemandforESCOs? Ifnegative,doyouseethisasbarrier?Ifpositive,doyouseethisasdriver?


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Institutionalcontexts(Political,Legal,Economic,Financial)

Opinionquestions Directquestions Follow-upquestions
ESCOismoreviable,
whentherelevant
institutionalcontexts
aresupportive.
Political:WhatarethegovernmentalpoliciestowardESCOindustry?
Areyouawareofthesubsidiesandtaxincentivesfromgovernment?

Isitsupportiveornot?Doyouseeitasdriverorbarrier?
Haveyourcompanyappliedthem?Doyouseethemasdrivers?
Legal:Howwellisthelegalenforcementoncontract?
Howwellarethecontractingstandards?
HowwellaretheM&Vstandards?
Howwellarethepublicprocurementprocedures?




Ifgood,doyouseethisas
driver?
Ifbad,doyouseethisas
barrier?
Economic:Howdoesexternalfactors(energyprices,financialcrisisoreconomicdownturn)intheeconomicaffectingtheESCOs?

Doyouseeincreasingenergypriceasdriver?
Financial:Doesyourcompanyfinancetheprojectinvestmentbyitselforthroughthird-partyfinancialinstitutions(FI)?
Doesyourcompanyhavesufficientaccesstocapitals?
WhataretheFIs’policiestowardESCOprojectfunding?Ifnegative,doyouseethisasbarrier?
Ifno,doyouseethisasbarrier?
Free discussion
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Concludingquestion
Besideabove,whatotherbarriersanddriversyouarefacing?
Opinionquestionsaremeasuredon7-pointLikertscale


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Appendix C
Interviewed Chinese ESCOs
Date: 12.03.2013
Interviewee’s title: Deputy General Manager
Company A was established in 2010 and is a listed company. Initial registered capital was over
200  million  RMB.  Company  A  focuses  on  the  field  of  waste  heat  power  generation.  At  the
moment,  A  is  one  of  the  companies  with  most  domestic  waste  heat  power  generation  ESCO
projects. Most of A’s projects are in the cement and glass industries with mostly large state-
owned enterprises as customers. By the end of 2011, company had 17 projects running, 3 under
construction and 9 in the planning phase. The turnover was 183 million and profit 52 million
RMB in the same year. All of its projects were done under the shared savings model. General
project  duration was 20 years with breakeven point at  5-6 years.  Company was awarded by the
EMCA as “China energy conversation service industry annual top brand enterprise” in year 2010
and 2011 and registered with NDRC & MOF in the fourth batch.
Date: 20.03.2013
Interviewees’ titles: Northern China Area Manager & Manager Assistant
Company B is a subsidiary of a Group Corporation concentrating on developing and producing
non-electric central air conditioning equipment. The company is technology-oriented and serves
mainly industry and commercial customers mostly in the private sectors. They use both shared
shaving and guaranteed saving models and belongs to the first batch of ESCOs registered with
NDRC and MOF.
Date: 26.03.2013
Interviewees’ titles: Marketing Director & Senior Engineer
Company C was established in 2006 and is one of the leading building energy saving solutions
providers within the energy management systems market. Company provides a wide range of
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products and professional services within the Building Technology sector. C positions itself as a
technology and capital-oriented ESCO. With its 400 employees, the company mainly focuses on
the large-scale bundled public building energy efficiency projects with city governments as
customers. Company C is one of the first batch ESCOs registered by NDRC and MOF.
Date: 27.03.2013
Interviewees’ titles: Deputy General Manager & Senior Engineer
Company D is one of the nine subsidiaries of a Group Corporation, formerly a logistic institution
of Chinese military. D has over 900 employees and its own production facilities in two cities.
With  10  million  RMB  registered  capital,  D  is  one  of  the  third  batch  ESCOs  registered  with
NDRC and MOF. The company mainly focuses in providing waste heat and pressure reuse and
industry boiler upgrade services. The average return on investment period is three to five years
for company’s ESCO projects. The customer scope is mainly large state-owned industry
enterprises. The company is recently new to EPC mechanism as it was previously mainly an
equipment supplier.
Date: 27.03.2013
Interviewees’ titles: General Manager & Project Manager
Company E was registered by a group of energy saving environmental protection experts in 2011.
The  company  is  a  member  of  EMCA  and  registered  by  NDRC  and  MOF  in  the  third  batch.
Company consists 20 employees and focuses on providing energy management services for
public and commercial buildings. The main products relate to heating and cooling monitoring
systems. The company uses both shared and guaranteed savings models in their ESCO projects
and project durations vary from one and half to two years.
Date: 29.03.2013
Interviewee’s title: Deputy General Manager
Company F is a market-oriented ESCO established in 2012 with 5 million RMB registered
capital.  F  is  a  subsidiary  of  a  Group  Corporation,  which  has  successful  operated  in  Yangtze
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River Delta area for over 20 years. Under the Group’s strong support, F has large customer base
and strong financial advantage. ESCO company is not yet registered with NDRC & MOF.
